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CORPORATIONS
Wm aR BnmERw , JR.*
A. Incorporated Associations
Litigation in the corporate area was scant over the past survey
period. In general, no new concepts were originated and the
writer has felt little need to do more than briefly review the
cases.
The power of the secretary of state to deny an application
for a corporate charter was raised in Commonweath Inv. co.
v. Thornton.' The plaintiff-appellants had applied for a char-
ter to engage in the business of industrial banking. Shortly
after the plaintiffs submitted their applications, the legislature
repealed the section of the South Carolina Code relating to in-
dustrial banks,2 and enacted a section 3 providing that persons
formerly chartered as an industrial bank could "apply for and
obtain a license to do business as a small loan company." The
secretary of state denied the applications on the ground that the
plaintiffs were trying to circumvent the requirements of the
act regulating small loan companies. The plaintiff then brought
an action for a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of
state to issue the charters. The lower court found that the plain-
tiffs had filed their applications just before the amendment on
the theory that this would automatically entitle them to do
business as a small loan company without meeting the require-
ments of the act regulating small loan companies.4 The South
Carolina Supreme Court, by way of dictum, agreed with the
lower court that merely obtaining a charter as an industrial
bank would not automatically entitle the plaintiffs to engage in
business as a small loan company. However, the court refused
to pass on the right of appellants to engage in the small loan
business as the issue presented was not what rights are granted
by a charter, but whether the secretary of state had discretionary
power to deny an application for a charter.
* Associate, Cooper, Gary, Nexsen & Pruet, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. 244 S.C. 146, 135 S.E.2d 762 (1964).
2. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1962, p. 1882 repealing S.C. CODE AiN. § 8-232
(1962).
3. S.C. CoDE Aim. § 8-739 (Supp. 1965).
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Section 12-59 of the 1962 Code5 provided that upon the filing
of certain information, "the Secretary of State shall issue" a
charter. From the words "shall issue" the court concluded that
once the preliminary requirements were met, the secretary of
state had no discretion to refuse to issue the charter.
Since section 12-59 has been repealed, the question arises
whether a different result would be reached under the new
Business Corporation Act.6 Section 12-14.47 of the Business Cor-
poration Act provides that the secretary of state shall determine
whether the articles of incorporation contain the information re-
quired to be in the articles8 and "upon making such determina-
tion, the Secretary of State shall file the articles of incorpora-
tion." (emphasis added.) From the word "shall," there can be
no doubt but that the same result would have been reached under
the new act (assuming of course that the articles contained the
information now required).
Peeples v. Orkin Emterminating Co.,9 was an action for breach
of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. The contract in
question was one of a continuing nature, requiring the defendant
to make periodic inspections of buildings it had treated for
termites, and to render such further treatment or make such
repairs as found necessary. The defendant, a domestic corpor-
ation, moved for a change of venue on the ground that it had
no place of business or property in the county where suit was
brought. Considering the word "property" within the meaning
of the venue statute, 10 the court pointed out that property is a
general term used to designate the right of ownership, and in-
cludes every subject upon which such a right can legally attach,
and held that the contract in question, being of a continuous
nature and in the possession of a resident of the county, consti-
tuted property within the county for venue purposes. The court
relied on (ibbes v. National Hosp. Serv., Inc." which held that
an insurance policy in the hands of the insured was property
within the meaning of the venue statute. Distinguished were
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-59 (1962) (emphasis added.), repealed by S.C.
AcTs & J. REs. 1962, p. 1996.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-11.1 to -24.9 (Supp. 1965).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.4 (Supp. 1965).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-11.1 to -11.6 (Supp. 1965).
9. 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E2d 845 (1964).
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-421 (1962).
11. 202 S.C. 304, 24 S.E2d 513 (1942).
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Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., 12 and Hopkins v. Sun Crest
Bottling o.13 on the ground that the property therein involved
was only "temporarily" located within the county.
The court also held that a person performing the function of
a telephone answering service was not an agent of the corpora-
tion for purposes of the venue statute. As the person in question
had no authority except to answer the telephone and take mes-
sages, this holding is not subject to criticism.
Bzantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp.14 was an action against an
airplane manufacturer resulting from an airplane crash which
occurred in Tennessee. The plaintiff was a citizen of Illinois,
and the defendant was a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in Kansas. The defendant moved to dismiss
on the ground that it was neither incorporated nor doing busi-
ness in South Carolina and was not therefore amenable to process
in South Carolina. This raised the oft-ligated problem of Inter-
national Shoe Co. 'v. Washington15 of whether a corporation is
present in a state for the purposes of obtaining jurisdiction. The
specific question was whether the defendant's contacts with a
distributor of its products in South Carolina were of such a
nature as to subject the defendant to suit in this state. It ap-
peared, among other things, that Beech set a sales quota for the
distributor, controlled its sales policies, controlled the amount
and type of advertising of its products by the distributor, con-
trolled the accounting system of the distributor insofar as sales
of its product were concerned, and that Beech personnel con-
ducted training programs in South Carolina for personnel of
the distributor. In short, the court found that Beech exercised
virtually complete control over the distributor, and held that
Beech was doing business in South Carolina through its dis-
tributor to such an extent as to be amenable to process in this
state. On appeal,' 6 the fourth circuit had little more to say than
that the facts warranted the conclusion reached by the district
court.
12. 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d 417 (1951). The truck used to make deliveries
from another county was not property in the county under the venue statute.
13. 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E.2d 755 (1955). Crates and bottles which were re-
moved from the county after consumption of the drinks were not property of the
beverage company within the meaning of the statute.
14. 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965), affd., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393 (E.D.S.C. 1965),
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B. Unincorporated Associations
In Bouchette v. InternationaZ Ladies Garment Workers
Union1 7 the plaintiff brought an action against the union to
recover damages resulting from a strike. The action was brought
under the provisions of section 10-215 of the South Carolina
Code which provides that an unincorporated association may be
sued under the name and style by which it operates, without
naming the individual members. The defendant argued that
since the statute did not give an unincorporated association a
corresponding right to sue in its own name, and since the de-
fendant did not have such a right at common law, the statute
deprived defendant of equal protection of the laws and was,
therefore, unconstitutional.
The court sidestepped the constitutional issue by holding that
by necessary implication, the statutes dealing with unincorpor-
ated associations confer the right of an unincorporated associ-
ation to maintain a suit in the name and style under which it
operates. Specifically the court pointed out that an unincorpor-
ated association is recognized under a common name as a party
against which suit may be brought,18 as capable of having an
agent upon whom process may be served,19 as an entity against
which a judgment may be obtained and against whose property
an execution may issue to satisfy such judgment" and as having
status to register trademarks and to bring actions for the pro-
tection thereof.
21
The authorities on the point decided are in conflict 22 and the
court could have easily decided this case either way. Practition-
ers will no doubt find the holding of the case convenient and use-
10-214 (1962) prevented the action from being maintained in this state, was
presented on appeal.
This section reads:
An action against a corporation created by or under the laws of any
other state, government or country may be brought in the circuit court:
(1) By any resident of this State for cause of action; or (2) By a plain-
tiff not a resident of this State when the cause of action shall have arisen
or the subject of the action shall be situated within this State.
The question involved a conflict of state and federal policies. For a discussion
of this point see 17 S.C.L. REv. 631 (1965).
17. 245 S.C. 586, 141 S.E.2d 834 (1965).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-429 (1962).
19. Ibid.
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1516 (1962).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-201 to -214 (1962).
22. See 6 Am. Jvm. 2d Associations and Clubs § 52 (1963); 7 CJ.S. Associa-
tions § 35 (1937).
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ful in many cases. However, the case does raise some questions.
For example, who is bound by the decision as far as the members
of the association are concerned when a suit is brought under
the name of an unincorporated association? 23
C. Legislation
Several items of interest in the corporate field were enacted
during the past survey period. A statute of interest not only in
the corporation field, but also to estate planners is Act No. 178.
The act reads:
Certain survivors to be treated as owners of stock and
other securities.-A corporation may treat as absolute owner
of shares or other securities the survivor or survivors of per-
sons to whom the same have'been or may have been issued
with the words 'as joint tenants with the right of survivor-
ship' or 'as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and
not as tenants in common' following the names, upon the
death of one or more of such persons.
2 4
It is to be noted that the statute does not create a joint tenancy
as such where the appropriate words are used. It only provides
that a corporation may treat such a survivor as absolute owner.
It could be argued that the statute is designed only for-the pro-
tection of the corporation, and that it does not serve to create
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Such a result would
leave open the question of whether code section 19-55, providing
for the distribution of property held in joint tenancy as if the
same were held by tenancy in common, applied.25 However, it
would appear more probable that a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship would be created if the statutory words were used.
The statutory wording would evince the clearest intent to estab-
lish a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, and it has been
held that section 19-55 does not prevent the creation of a right
23. For a discussion of this and related problems see 6 Am. JUR. 2d A.ssocia-
tions and Clubs §§ 52-54 (1963); 7 CJ.S. Associations § 35 (1937).
24. S.C. AcTs & J. Ras. 1965, p. 243.
25. Vhen any person shall be at the time of his death, seized or possessed
of any estate in joint tenancy, the same shall be adjudged to be severed by
the death of the joint tenant and shall be distributable as if the same were
a tenancy in common.
S.C. COPE ANN. § 19-55 (1962).
5
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of survivorship where the same is expressly created by contract
or otherwise.
26
Section 12w23.1527 of the Business Corporation Act was amend-
ed to provide for an additional penalty for foreign corporations
doing business in South Carolina without authority. In its
original form, the statute provided that a foreign corporation
conducting business in this state without authority would be
liable for all fees, penalties, and franchise taxes for the years
during which it did business in this state without authority. The
amendment provides for a fine of ten dollars per day for each
day the corporation fails to pay the fees, penalties and franchise
taxes which are levied on such corporations for doing business
in this state.
28
The provision of the amendment appears to be a carryover
from the old corporation act which imposed a similar penalty
for failure to file required papers and failure to pay any of the
fees required of foreign corporations.29 Under the old act, it
was held in State v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co.30 that the
two year statute of limitations imposed by section 10-1453, would
apply to any action to recover the penalty. An attempt was made
in the Liggett case to distinguish between the use of the word
"penalty" as appeared in the state of limitations and the use of
the word "fine" as appeared in the act imposing the fine. The
court rejected this distinction and held that the statute of
limitations applied. In view of the holding of this case, the two
year statute of limitations should also apply to the present
statute which calls for a "fine."3 2
Neatly tucked away in the General Appropriations Act of
1965 is a provision amending the tax laws to require corporations
26. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Thackston, 224 S.C. 445, 79 S.E.2d 714 (1954);
Davis v. Davis, 223 S.C. 182, 75 S.E.2d 46 (1953).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-23.15 (Supp. 1965).
28. S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 232.
29. S.C. AcTs & J. Rxs. 1962, p. 1996 repealing S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-737
(1962).
30. State v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 171 S.C. 511, 172 S.E. 857
(1933), appeal disnmissed, 291 U.S. 652 (1934).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-145 (1962).
32. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the title of the amendment
refers to a penalty. The title reads:
An Act to amend item (a) of Section 13.15 (sic) of Act No. 347 of 1962,
relating to foreign corporations doing business in this state without author-
ity, so as to provide an additional penalty for such corporations.
S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1965, p. 232. (emphasis added.)
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to file estimated tax returns.83 Under the new provisions, a cor-
poratioxf is required to file a tax return estimating its taxes for
the coming year. The return is to be filed during the third month
of the taxable year. Amendments making adjustments may be
filed in the sixth, ninth, or thirteenth month after the beginning
of the taxable year. Under the statute, estimated taxes will be
prepaid. However, an installment plan is provided and no in-
terest is charged for using the installment plan.
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